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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 28, 2007, five teenage girls were killed when the car in which 
they were traveling crossed the center line of a two-lane highway and 
collided with an oncoming tractor-trailer.1  The car exploded into flames and 
all five girls were killed on impact.2  Upon review of the driver’s phone 
records, police determined that the driver received a text message at 10:06:29 
p.m. asking, “What are you doing?”3  The crash was reported to authorities 
at 10:07 p.m.4 
“Because text messaging requires visual, manual, and cognitive 
attention from the driver, it is one of the most alarming distractions.”5  Forty-
one states and the District of Columbia ban text messaging for all drivers.6  
New Jersey goes even farther, not only prohibiting texting while driving,7  
but also enacting a law that provides criminal penalties to drivers who injures 
others while distracted by cell phones.8  Senator Fred Madden, a sponsor of 
the bill establishing the statue, stated, “Sometimes those distractions can have 
tragic results.  That is why it is important to send a message that such 
behavior must cease.”9   
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1.  Text Messages Sent on Phone of Driver Before Fatal Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at B3. 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id.  
4.  Id. 
5.  NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DIGEST OF DISTRACTED DRIVING LAWS, at iv (1st ed. 
2013). 
6.  Id.  
7.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:4-97.3 (West 2014). 
8.  Id. at § 2C:11-5. 
9.  Michelle Caffrey, Family of Toni Donato-Bolis Relieved to See ‘Kulesh, Kubert and Bolis Bill’ 
Against Distracted Driving Signed Into Law, SOUTH JERSEY TIMES, July 19, 2012, 
http://www.nj.com/washington-township-times/index.ssf/2012/07/family_of_toni_donato-
bolis_re.html. 
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Although public policy mandates a reduction in texting while driving,10 
arguably this is a duty that should fall on drivers.  However, New Jersey does 
not stop there.  In Kubert v. Best, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division, imposed a new duty on remote texters.11   
This Note will examine Kubert in regard to the new duty imposed upon 
remote texters.  This Note will argue it was unnecessary for the court to 
formulate a new duty regarding a remote third party’s obligation not to text 
the driver of a motor vehicle because the duty to avoid texting while driving 
should fall solely on the driver.  Section II will provide an overview of the 
relevant case law regarding the creation of a new duty.  Section III will 
specifically examine the opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey in 
Kubert.  Finally, Section IV will analyze why the majority in Kubert was 
incorrect to create a new duty for remote texters, how the court should have 
come to a different result, and why the new duty created will rarely be met.  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
“A duty is an obligation imposed by law requiring one party ‘to 
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.’”12  In Kubert, 
the court created a new duty that remote texters refrain from texting someone 
whom they know is driving and who will read the text message.13  As this 
was a case of first impression regarding the existence of a duty for remote 
texters,14 the court analogized a remote texter to a passenger’s relationship 
with a driver.15  The court reasoned that when a texter sends a message to 
someone they know is driving who will read the message, the texter is 
distracting the driver in the same way a passenger could.16  The court stated, 
“When the sender knows that the text will reach the driver while operating a 
vehicle, the sender has a relationship to the public who use the roadways 
similar to that of a passenger physically present in the vehicle.”17  Thus, to 
understand the decision reached in Kubert, it is necessary to examine both 
the analysis New Jersey courts use in the creation of a new duty as well as 
other instances where the courts have found passengers in a vehicle liable for 
harm caused by the driver. 
                                                                                                                 
10.  Injury Prevention & Control: Motor Vehicle Safety, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/distracted_driving/.  
11.  Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
12.  Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 424 (N.J. 2007) (quoting DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS: LAWYER’S EDITION § 53, at 356 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
13.  Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1228.  
14.  Id.  
15.  Id.  
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
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A.  Duty Analysis in Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus  
In Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court established that creating a new duty of care must be fair in 
consideration of the circumstances while also addressing public policy 
concerns.18  To determine fairness, a court must identify, weigh, and balance 
“the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the 
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the 
proposed solution.”19  The court determined that a duty based strictly upon 
the foreseeability of harm and how the defendant should have responded does 
not support traditional goals of tort law.20  A new duty should not be created 
unless it formulates a rational rule that will uniformly remedy both current 
and future issues.21    
The Supreme Court of New Jersey pointed out that although the 
foreseeability of an injury is a significant factor in determining the existence 
of a duty, “[f]airness, not foreseeability alone, is the test.”22  In assessing 
whether to apply a new duty of care, a court should focus on all the factors 
discussed above and not allow foreseeability alone to dictate a new duty of 
care.23   
Although courts have the authority to establish a new duty of care, they 
can also look to other torts theories when determining liability.  To establish 
liability for third parties, courts may examine whether parties fall into legally 
recognized special relationships and also whether one party aided and abetted 
the other party’s tortious conduct through substantial assistance or 
encouragement.24   
B.  Liability for Passengers  
Courts have generally recognized a duty does not extend to a third 
party’s ability to control the conduct of another to prevent him from causing 
harm.25  However, courts have found exceptions to this general rule by 
                                                                                                                 
18.  69 A.3d 1247, 1255 (N.J. 2013). 
19.  Id. at 1258. 
20.  Id. at 1261. 
21.  Id. at 1258. 
22.  Id. at 1260. 
23.  Id.  
24. See Podias v. Mairs, 926 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (examining both the duty 
analysis and aiding and abetting and holding that  passengers have a duty to take precautions to 
prevent a driver from leaving the scene of an accident or are deemed liable for substantially 
encouraging the driver to leave the scene of the accident). 
25.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).  
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examining other tort principles such as the existence of a legally recognized 
special relationship and aiding and abetting.26 
1.  Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee 
Rather than pure control, courts have held that passengers may be liable 
for the unlawful conduct of a driver if there is a special relationship or if the 
passenger aids and abets the tortfeasor’s misconduct.27  In Champion ex rel. 
Ezzo v. Dunfee, the court analyzed these exceptions to passenger non-
liability.28   
 A special relationship exists when the passenger can exercise control 
over the driver’s conduct.29  The court cited the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, which provides that a duty to control the conduct of another occurs if 
“a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.”30  
Special relationships that are legally recognized include relationships 
between a parent-child, master-servant, landlord-tenant, and guardian-
ward.31  If a relationship does not fit into one of the special relationship 
categories described, “the actor is not subject to liability if he fails, either 
intentionally or through inadvertence, to exercise his ability so to control the 
actions of third persons as to protect another from even the most serious 
harm.”32 
In Champion, the defendant, a front seat passenger, did not have a 
special relationship with the driver who crashed an automobile and injured a 
backseat passenger.33  The defendant was dating the driver at the time of the 
accident,34 and the court held that the defendant’s relationship with the driver 
did not qualify as a special relationship.35 
                                                                                                                 
26.  See Podias, 926 A.2d 859 (examining both the duty analysis and aiding and abetting and holding 
that  passengers have a duty to take precautions to prevent a driver from leaving the scene of an 
accident or are deemed liable for substantially encouraging the driver to leave the scene of the 
accident). 
27.  A defendant aids and abets another’s tortious conduct when, “ (1) a primary tortfeasor committed a 
tort against a plaintiff, (2) the defendant knew that the primary tortfeasor’s conduct was a breach of 
duty, and (3) the defendant substantially assisted or encouraged the primary tortfeasor in 
committing the tort.”  74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 61 (2014) (emphasis added). 
28.  939 A.2d 825, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).  
29.  Id. at 830. 
30.  Id.  
31.  Id.  
32.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 cmt. b (1965). 
33.  Champion, 939 A.2d at 833. 
34.  Id. at 827.  
35.  Id. at 833.  
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The second “no duty” exception results if the passenger aids and abets 
the driver’s tortious conduct through substantial assistance or 
encouragement.36  A passenger who is merely a companion in the vehicle and 
has not encouraged the driver to engage in tortious conduct is not liable for 
the party’s conduct.37  Substantial encouragement does not require active 
physical participation in the tortious conduct; rather, advice and 
encouragement are sufficient to satisfy the test.38  The court cited several 
examples when a passenger encouraged a driver to engage in a tortious act.39  
Substantial encouragement was shown where a “respected . . .  authority 
figure” encouraged a minor driver to prove an automobile’s performance 
ability.40  In Champion, the defendant was a companion, and there was no 
proof she supported the motorist in driving while intoxicated.41  Although the 
evidence showed the defendant did not object to the intoxicated driving, she 
repeatedly told the driver to slow down, which was sufficient to demonstrate 
the defendant’s behavior did not constitute substantial encouragement.42 
2.  Podias v. Mairs 
The full duty analysis and aiding and abetting theory of negligence were 
both illustrated in Podias v. Mairs.43  In that case, an intoxicated driver lost 
control of his vehicle and collided with a motorcyclist.44  The two passengers 
encouraged the driver to leave the scene of the accident and the motorcyclist 
lying in the middle of the road.45  The passengers had cell phones and used 
them numerous times following the accident, but they never phoned for 
emergency assistance.46  As the motorcyclist lay injured in the road, he was 
eventually run over by another driver.47   
The Court held that the passengers owed a duty to the motorcyclist.48  
Creation of a duty requires a court to balance factors including the “nature of 
the underlying risk of harm . . . the opportunity and ability to exercise care to 
                                                                                                                 
36.  Id. at 831. 
37.  Id. at 831–32.  
38.  See Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 255 (2005).  
39.  Champion, 939 A.2d at 831.  
40.  Id.  See also Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d (Ark. 1975) (holding the nature of a security 
guard’s comments and his authoritative relationship to the minor motorist evidenced substantial 
encouragement).  
41.  Champion, 939 A.2d at 833. 
42.  Id.  
43.  926 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).   
44.  Id. at 862. 
45.  Id.  
46.  Id.  
47.  Id.  
48.  Id. at 866. 
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prevent the harm, the comparative interests of, and the relationships between 
or among the parties, and ultimately, based on considerations of public policy 
and fairness . . . .”49  Courts should also examine whether the defendant is 
responsible for creating the harm and “whether the defendant had sufficient 
control, opportunity, and ability to have avoided the risk of harm.”50  
Plaintiffs must prove a defendant knowingly provided substantial 
assistance.51 
 By failing to assist the injured motorcyclist, the passengers were 
responsible for his death.52  It was foreseeable the injured motorcyclist would 
be harmed or killed when the passengers left him lying in the middle of the 
road.53  Furthermore, the death “might have been avoided with little effort 
and inconvenience . . .” had the passengers used their phones to call for 
emergency assistance.54  The court determined that imposing a duty that 
passengers assist an injured motorist under these circumstances was fair and 
rationally related to public policy.55   
 Alternatively, the court determined that the passengers could be found 
liable under the common-law tort theory of aiding and abetting.56  A 
defendant can be held to have aided and abetted if he provides “substantial 
assistance” to a tortfeasor.57  The factors a court must use to determine 
substantial assistance are, “the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of 
assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the 
tort, his relation to the other [tortfeasor] and his state of mind . . . . ”58  The 
court found that one could conclude the passengers either collaborated in or 
encouraged the driver’s decision to abandon the motorcyclist because the 
passengers were aware of the driver’s wrongdoing and wanted to disassociate 
themselves from the potential legal repercussions.59  By encouraging the 
driver to leave the scene of the accident, the passengers exhibited their 
substantial assistance in preventing the driver from calling for emergency 
assistance and fleeing the scene of the accident.60   
                                                                                                                 
49.  Id. at 865. 
50.  Id. at 866.   
51.  Combs, supra note 38, at 290.   
52.  Podias, 926 A.2d at 866.   
53.  Id.  Although the Desir court held that foreseeability alone is insufficient to control a duty, the court 
in Podias held that foreseeability was a factor to consider.  Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. 
Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1261 (N.J. 2013).   
54.  Podias, 926 A.2d at 869.    
55.  Id. at 866.  
56.  Id. at 869.  
57.  Id. at 867 (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
58.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d (1979)). 
59.  Id. at 868.   
60.  Id.  
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In summary, a third party generally does not have a duty to control the 
conduct of another to prevent harm61 unless a special relationship exists or 
the third party aided and abetted the behavior through substantial assistance 
or encouragement.62  A court may impose a new duty, but the “duty [must] 
derive from considerations of public policy and fairness,”63 and cannot hinge 
completely on the foreseeability of harm.64  However, in Kubert, the court 
created a duty for remote texters based almost entirely on the foreseeability 
of harm.65   
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE  
 In Kubert v. Best, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, 
considered whether seventeen-year-old Shannon Colonna (“Defendant”) was 
liable when the person she was texting lost control of his car and severely 
injured the Plaintiffs.66  The court found that she was not liable.67  However, 
in so doing the court held “that a person sending text messages has a duty not 
to text someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has special reason to 
know, the recipient will view the text while driving.”68 
A.  Facts and Procedural Posture 
In September 2009, eighteen-year-old Kyle Best and Shannon Colonna 
(collectively, “Defendants”) were friends who texted each other every day.69  
On September 21, 2009, the Defendants texted each other sixty-two times, 
ate lunch at Best’s home, and remained together until Best had to leave for 
work.70  At 5:41 p.m., Best clocked out of work and texted the Defendant at 
5:42 p.m.71  Best then left his job and began the drive home.72  A record of 
the Defendant’s text messages showed that at 5:48:14 p.m. the Defendant 
sent a text to Best, and he responded at 5:48:58.73  The content of these text 
                                                                                                                 
61.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). 
62.  Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
63.  Estate of Desir ex. rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1258 (N.J. 2013) (citing Hopkins v. Fox 
& Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993)). 
64.  Id. at 1260.  
65.  Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. at 1229. 
68.  Id. at 1221. 
69.  Id. at 1119. 
70.  Id. at 1220. 
71.  Id.  
72.  Id.  
73.  Id.  
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messages is unknown.74  Within seconds of his responding text, Best’s pickup 
truck crossed the centerline of the road and struck the Plaintiffs who were 
riding a motorcycle.75  As a result of the accident, both of the Plaintiffs 
suffered severe injuries and lost their left legs.76   
Best settled with the Plaintiffs, and he was no longer a party to the suit.77  
The Plaintiffs sued the Defendant, arguing that she “aided and abetted Best’s 
unlawful texting while driving, and . . . she had an independent duty to avoid 
texting a person who was driving a motor vehicle.”78  The Plaintiffs argued 
that the Defendant knew Best was driving because she texted him at 5:48 
p.m., less than a minute before the accident.79  The Defendant moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that she was unaware Best was driving and had 
no duty to avoid sending text messages to him.80  The trial judge agreed and 
granted summary judgment to the Defendant.81  The Plaintiffs appealed to 
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, to overrule the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment and hold the Defendant liable under a 
proximate cause theory of negligence for texting Best when she knew Best 
was driving.82   
B.  The Majority Opinion  
To begin, the court determined that the Defendant’s liability could not 
be established through a special relationship or an aiding and abetting 
theory.83  Special relationships are legally recognized relationships in which 
one party can exercise control over another’s conduct.84  The Defendant and 
Best were just friends, which does place them into a legally recognized 
special relationship through which the Defendant could control Best’s 
conduct.85 
 Aiding and abetting requires a passenger to have “actively encouraged 
the driver to commit the negligent act.”86  To prove aiding and abetting, the 
                                                                                                                 
74.  Id. at 1221. 
75.  Id. at 1219. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 1222. 
78.  Id. at 1221.  
79.  Id.  
80.  Id.  
81.  Id.  
82.  Id.  
83.  Id. at 1225. 
84.  Id. at 1224.  
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. (citing Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)). 
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Plaintiffs had to show the Defendant “urged Best to read and respond to her 
text while he was driving,” which they failed to do.87   
There was no evidence that by texting Best, the Defendant actively 
encouraged him to respond.88  The Defendant sent one text message 
approximately twenty-five seconds before the crash, and although the content 
of the message was unknown, the mere sending of text messages, without 
more, does not constitute active encouragement that the driver violate the law 
by responding immediately.89   
 As for the Plaintiffs’ argument that the Defendant had a duty not to text 
someone she knew was driving, the court determined that “one should not be 
held liable for sending a wireless transmission simply because some recipient 
might use his cell phone unlawfully and become distracted while driving.”90  
A texter is not liable for merely sending a message to a specific recipient, 
even if he knows the recipient is driving.91   
 Although the court found the Defendant was not liable, the court 
determined that it was necessary to create a new duty for remote third party 
texters.92  The remote sender “has a duty not to text someone who is driving 
if the texter knows or has special reason to know, the recipient will view the 
text while driving.”93  To breach this duty, the sender must know or have 
special reason to know, the driver will read the message while driving and 
will become distracted from the task of driving.94  Showing prior experiences 
in which the recipient responded to a text message while driving can prove 
knowledge or special reason to know.95 
 The court compared a remote texter to a passenger physically present 
in a car who distracts a driver.96  Like a physically present passenger, the 
sender of a text must avoid distracting the driver of a vehicle to protect 
motorists sharing the roadways.97  A passenger would be liable for an 
accident if the passenger distracted the driver by placing a photo in front of 
the driver’s face and encouraging the driver to look at the photograph.98  The 
court concluded the passenger’s purposeful distraction of the driver would 
                                                                                                                 
87.  Id. at 1225. 
88.  Id.  
89.  Id. at 1224.  
90.  Id. at 1226.   See also Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742 (W.D.N.C. 
2011) (dismissing a products liability claim against the manufacturer of a text message device in a 
tractor-trailer and holding that the driver has a duty to avoid distraction by not viewing a message).  
91.  Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1226.  
92.  Id. at 1221. 
93.  Id.  
94.  Id. at 1226.  
95.  Id. at 1228. 
96.  Id.  
97.  Id.  
98.  Id. at 1226–27.  
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constitute independent negligence, not aiding and abetting.99  In the same 
way, a sender of a text message could distract a driver by encouraging the 
driver to look and respond to a text message.100  
 The court believed foreseeability was crucial in determining whether to 
impose a duty.101  If a party is aware their actions create a risk of injury, the 
harm is foreseeable.102  A sender of a text message disregards a foreseeable 
risk when he or she texts someone he or she knows is driving because “it is 
foreseeable that a driver who is actually distracted by a text message might 
cause an accident and serious injuries or death.”103  The court determined that 
this foreseeable harm could be avoided relatively easily by refraining from 
texting someone known to be driving who will immediately view the text.104   
 In this case, the Plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence to prove the 
Defendant knew Best was driving and would view and respond to the text 
while driving.105  The evidence showed that the Defendant sent one text to 
Best while he was driving, but no evidence indicated she was aware Best 
would read and respond to the text immediately while driving.106  Based on 
the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that the trial judge properly 
granted summary judgment for the Defendant.107 
C.  Judge Espinosa’s Concurring Opinion  
 Judge Espinosa agreed with the majority’s holding that summary 
judgment for the Defendant was correct.108  However, in Espinosa’s view, 
the majority should not have created a new duty specifically for remote 
texters.109  Rather, Espinosa believed traditional tort principles, specifically 
aiding and abetting and special relationships, provide ample guidance to 
determine whether a remote texter is liable for an accident caused by the 
recipient of the text message.110  
 Espinosa disagreed with the majority’s comparison of a remote texter 
to a passenger physically present in a vehicle.111  He argued that a remote 
texter cannot be held to the same standard as a passenger physically present 
                                                                                                                 
99.  Id. at 1227. 
100.  Id. at 1228.  
101.  Id. at 1227.  
102.  Id.  
103.  Id.  
104.  Id. at 1228. 
105.  Id. at 1229. 
106.  Id.  
107.  Id.  
108.  Id. (Espinosa, J., concurring).  
109.  Id. at 1229–30. 
110.  Id. at 1230–31. 
111.  Id.  
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in a vehicle because a remote texter does not have the ability to control the 
driver’s actions.112  Furthermore, remote texters lack “first-hand knowledge 
of the circumstances attendant to the driver’s operation of the vehicle that a 
passenger possesses.”113    
 Espinosa did, however, believe a discussion regarding passenger 
liability was useful.114  The Restatement (Second) of Torts and the New 
Jersey courts have recognized two exceptions to passenger non-liability: 
when a special relationship exists between the passenger and driver that 
affords the passenger some control over the driver, and when the passenger 
aids and abets in the driver’s tortious conduct through substantial 
encouragement or assistance.115  The first exception was not applicable here 
because the Defendant did not have a special relationship with Best through 
which she could control his conduct.116  With regard to the second exception, 
substantial encouragement is proven by showing the Defendant “knowingly 
and substantially” assisted a party in completion of an illegal activity.117   
 Espinosa believed summary judgment should be upheld because the 
Plaintiffs provided no evidence that the Defendant was aware she was 
participating or furthering an illegal activity.118  Furthermore, the Defendant 
was not present in the car and therefore, was unaware of the circumstances.119  
The mere act of responding to Best’s text message did not prove any 
substantial encouragement.120  Espinosa also commented that if a duty is to 
fall on remote texters, it should be considered and decided by the 
legislature.121 
IV.  ANALYSIS  
 The majority’s decision in Kubert to create a new duty for remote 
texters was unnecessary.  The majority’s comparison of remote texters to 
passengers physically present is inappropriate because remote texters have 
no knowledge of the circumstances of the recipient.  Part A of this section 
will discuss how the duty not to text while driving falls completely on the 
driver.  Part B will discuss how other tort principles do not support 
                                                                                                                 
112.  Id.   
113.  Id.  
114.  Id.  
115.  Id. at 1230–31 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 876 (1965 & 1979)). 
116.  Id. at 1231. 
117.  Id. at 1231 (citing Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 2004)). 
118.  Id. at 1232. 
119.  Id.  
120.  Id.  
121.  Id. at 1233.  
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establishing liability for remote texters.  Part C will discuss how the new duty 
created by the court in Kubert will rarely be met.  
A.  It Is the Driver’s Duty not to Text and Drive   
 The majority was incorrect in creating a new duty for a remote texter 
because the responsibility not to text while driving should fall solely on the 
driver.  In Estate of Desir, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the 
creation of a new duty of care hinges on fairness.122  However, in creating 
this duty for remote texters, the court in Kubert overlooked fairness in 
exchange for what the majority believed to be the foreseeability of harm.123 
 While it may be true that texting while driving creates a foreseeable risk 
of injury, this is a foreseeable risk that the driver alone holds.  In Estate of 
Desir, the court held that a duty which focuses on the foreseeability of harm 
and how the defendant should have responded does not support traditional 
goals of tort law.124  By creating a new duty for remote texters, the Kubert 
court did just what the Supreme Court of New Jersey held was inappropriate 
because a duty does not revolve around the foreseeability that harm may 
occur.  Furthermore, the foreseeable risk of harm is lessened by the sender’s 
assumption that the recipient will not view and respond to the text message 
until it is safe to do so.   
 The remote texter is entitled to the assumption that once the recipient 
actually begins driving, he or she will not read or respond to text messages.  
The majority even concedes that “the driver bears responsibility for obeying 
the law and maintaining safe control of the vehicle.”125  The majority attempts 
to overcome this rule by extending the duty only when the sender knows the 
recipient is driving and will read the text while driving;126 however, this duty 
is unnecessary because the driver is ultimately the person responsible for 
avoiding texting while driving.  Just as it is the driver’s responsibility to avoid 
changing the radio station or talking to a passenger in a potentially dangerous 
situation, it is the driver’s responsibility to avoid viewing a text message, not 
the sender’s responsibility to avoid sending a text message.  The State of New 
Jersey has acknowledged this responsibility by enacting a law that provides 
criminal penalties to drivers who cause injuries to others while distracted by 
cellphones.127   
                                                                                                                 
122.  Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1260 (N.J. 2013).  
123.  Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227.  
124.  Estate of Desir, 69 A.3d at 1261 (arguing the goal of creating a new duty is advancing a public 
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125.  Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229.  
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 The analogy between a remote texter and a passenger physically present 
in a vehicle is inappropriate because a remote texter cannot appreciate the 
circumstances surrounding the recipient of a text message.  Judge Espinosa 
correctly asserted in his concurring opinion that a remote texter has no first-
hand knowledge of the situation and no control over the driver’s actions.128  
Drivers are aware of the illegality of texting while driving and the grave risk 
of harm it can cause, and only drivers have the ability to avoid viewing and 
responding to a text message.   
 In Podias, the court created a duty that passengers assist an injured 
motorist when the injury was related to their actions, the harm was 
foreseeable, and the harm could have been avoided with little effort.129  The 
passengers’ physical presence allowed them the opportunity to assess the risk 
of harm their actions created.  A remote texter does not have the same 
opportunity.  The inherent nature of texting undermines this analogy because 
texting is meant to be quick and can be done at almost any time, at any place.  
Unlike a physically present passenger, a sender cannot hear background 
noises or see the surroundings of the recipient to infer a dangerous situation.  
Thus, using this comparison as a basis for creating a new duty of care is 
improper.   
 The creation of a new duty of care requires a court to examine whether 
a defendant is responsible for creating the harm by determining if the 
defendant had sufficient control and ability to avoid the risk.130  Remote 
senders of text messages do not have sufficient control to avoid the risk; the 
control is in the hands of the driver.  In Podias, the passengers had the ability 
to control the harm to the motorcyclist by calling for emergency assistance 
or allowing the driver of the vehicle to call for emergency assistance.131  In 
Champion, the passenger, as the driver’s girlfriend, was not responsible for 
creating the harm because she did not encourage the driver’s behavior and 
had no ability to avoid the risk.132  A remote sender of a text message should 
be considered a remote companion who similarly has no control over the 
recipient’s automobile.  The majority mistakenly held a remote sender has 
any duty at all to avoid texting someone they know is driving, as the duty to 
avoid texting while driving falls completely on the driver. 
 
                                                                                                                 
128.  Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229 (Espinosa, J., concurring). 
129.  Podias v. Mairs, 926 A.2d 859, 866 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
130.  Id. at 866.   
131.  Id. at 869.  
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B.  Traditional Tort Principles Do Not Support Liability for Remote Texters 
 Although the court established a new duty for remote texters, the court 
could not find the Defendant liable based on the new duty.133  In Judge 
Espinosa’s concurrence, he argued that the creation of a new duty was not 
necessary to dismiss the Defendant from liability.134  He argued that 
traditional tort principles, specifically aiding and abetting or special 
relationships, are sufficient to determine liability for a remote texter.135  
Although these tort principles have been used in other cases as an exception 
to the general principle of passenger non-liability, they will not be useful in 
determining the liability of a remote texter.   
1.  Special Relationships 
 “A special relationship exists where the occupant has some control over 
the driver . . . .”136  Special relationships are insufficient to establish liability 
for remote texters because there is no element of control.  Unlike a child on 
good behavior around a parent, a child who is driving cannot feel pressure to 
respond because he or she should not even be looking at their phone while 
driving to know a parent has texted them.   
 Furthermore, establishing liability for remote texters through a special 
relationship is difficult because the only special relationships recognized by 
New Jersey courts are master-servant, parent-child, landlord-tenant, and 
guardian-ward.137  Arguments may be made that husband-wife relationships 
could be included in this special relationship category,138 but it is not one of 
the relationships listed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the authority 
adopted by New Jersey.139  Although special relationships may be beneficial 
to determine liability in some circumstances, the small amount of special 
relationships enforced will be insufficient to cover the majority of texting 
relationships.  For example, in Champion, the court held that the passenger 
had no special relationship to the driver because they were just dating.140  
Special relationships would be helpful in determining liability only between 
                                                                                                                 
133.  Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
134.  Id. at 1229–30 (Espinosa, J., concurring).  
135.  Id. at 1230–31. 
136.  Champion, 939 A.2d at 830. 
137.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316-20 (1979). 
138.  See Wagner v. Shlue, 605 A.2d 294, 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding that a  husband 
may be found liable if he gave car keys to his visibly intoxicated wife and she drove negligently, 
injuring another driver). 
139.  Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1231.   
140.  Champion, 939 A.3d at 833. 
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the few relationships covered in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.141  As 
such, special relationships will not be useful to assert liability for remote 
texters in the majority of situations because many texters will not fall into 
these legal relationships.  Most importantly, however, the driver should not 
even be looking at his phone while driving to know if the texter is a person 
with whom he or she has a special relationship.   
2.  Aiding and Abetting   
 Liability for a remote texter cannot be established through aiding and 
abetting, which requires substantial encouragement or assistance.142  As 
illustrated in Champion, substantial encouragement requires a party to be 
more than a companion to the tortious conduct.143  Sending a text message 
creates a companionship rather than substantial encouragement because 
either party can choose whether and when they respond.  Substantial 
encouragement cannot be established even where texters send messages 
immediately back and forth because there is no requirement, and it is even 
strongly discouraged, to respond to a message while driving.  Unlike a 
physically present passenger, a remote texter cannot offer substantial 
encouragement because one cannot force a driver to view a text message.  A 
physically present passenger can encourage a driver to speed or drive 
erratically because the driver will hear them, but a remote texter cannot urge 
a driver to read a text message.  The power is completely in the driver’s hands 
to avoid viewing a text message and responding when he or she pulls over or 
arrives at his or her destination.  
 One factor a court must consider when determining substantial 
assistance is presence at the time of the tortious conduct.144  A remote texter 
will never meet this element of substantial assistance because they will never 
be physically present with the driver in the vehicle.  Unlike Podias, where 
the passengers were present and were aware of the risk created by 
encouraging the driver to leave an injured motorcyclist in the road,145 a 
remote texter has limited knowledge of the recipient’s circumstances and any 
negligent act that may be occurring.  To hold a remote texter liable for an 
action they are unaware of and do not encourage is inappropriate.    
Although aiding and abetting and special relationships provide an 
exception to passenger non-liability in some circumstances, they do not 
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support establishing liability for remote texters.  It will be difficult to prove 
in the majority of circumstances that a remote texter either falls into a special 
relationship category or has the requisite knowledge to substantially assist or 
encourage a driver to unlawfully text and drive.  In Kubert, the majority 
examined these principles and determined liability for the Defendant did not 
exist.146  The court should have ended their analysis there and not gone on to 
create a new duty—a duty the Defendant was not even found to have 
breached.   
C.  The Duty Created Will Rarely Be Met  
 The duty of care created by the court in Kubert and the imposition of 
liability will rarely be met.147  The court’s requirement that the sender of a 
text message know not only that the recipient was driving, but also that he or 
she would immediately view and respond to the message is an extremely high 
burden and could not even be met in Kubert.148  
 In determining liability, it will be extremely difficult to establish 
whether the sender knows the recipient of a text message is driving.  The 
majority’s argument that past experiences may provide the sender with 
knowledge that the recipient will read and respond while driving places too 
great of a risk on the sender.  The inherent nature of texting is it is a quick 
and easy way to get in touch with someone.  The sender cannot hear 
background noises and rarely has any clue as to where someone is when they 
respond.  Neither party has any control over when the other will view or 
respond to the message.  Thus, it is ridiculous to place a duty on the sender 
of a text message to be aware of whether the recipient is driving, and if the 
recipient is driving, to know they will look and respond to the text message.  
Only the recipient of a text message can control when and where he or she 
views and responds to the message, and the duty to avoid texting and driving 
should fall completely on the driver, recipient. 
 The only scenario where it seems plausible that a remote texter may 
have the requisite knowledge required to breach this newly created duty is if 
two parties had a text conversation where the recipient admitted he was 
driving.  In only this scenario would a remote texter know with certainty that 
the recipient is both driving and will respond regardless of the act’s illegality.  
A remote texter would not have the requisite knowledge even if the recipient 
texted he or she was about to drive somewhere because the remote texter is 
entitled to the assumption that once the recipient actually begins driving, he 
or she will not read or respond to text messages.  Thus, the court created an 
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unnecessary duty that will almost never be breached due to a lack of 
knowledge by the sender.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
Texting while driving obviously creates grave risks that can end in 
serious injury or death; however, the majority in Kubert was incorrect to 
impose a duty on remote texters.  The majority’s comparison of remote 
texters to passengers physically present was inappropriate because remote 
texters have no knowledge of the circumstances of the recipient.  By 
examining traditional tort principals such as special relationships and aiding 
and abetting, the court could have reached the same result that the Defendant 
was not liable for the injuries to the Plaintiffs.  The court should have stopped 
their analysis after determining that the Defendant was not liable because the 
duty to avoid texting and driving is a duty that falls solely on drivers.  As 
such, it should not have been extended to include remote texters.  Finally, 
because the imposition of liability for breaching the duty will rarely, if ever, 
be met, the majority did little more than create a useless duty of care. 

